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ployees. The evidence in the case indicated that the employer involved, during the months of December, 1952, and January, 1953,
had 14 employees working in the mine. In a report to the government, the employer had reported his yearly average of employees
was 6.7. The State Coal Mine Inspection Report for the year 1952
showed that the company had an average of 9.4 men working during that year.
The Court held that to determine whether employees are "regularly engaged", the test is to determine whether the employment
was casual or whether these were regular employees engaged in the
business. It was held that the employees involved were regular
employees and not casual laborers and that therefore the Industrial
Commission had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
8
In the case of Pension Fund Trustees v. Starasinich,1
the
plaintiff was a police officer on the Pueblo Police Department for
23 years up to July 30, 1949, when he was discharged for misconduct. After his discharge, he applied for a pension, claiming that
he had incurred physical disabilities while he was a police officer
in good standing. The question to be determined was whether after
discharge an officer could apply for and receive a pension. The argument of the trustees was that under the statutes and ordinances
applicable, an officer must be in good standing at the time of the
application to be entitled to a pension. The Court held that in order
to be entitled to a pension, an officer must be in good standing at
the time of death or injury and that the fact that he has been discharged since his injury will not bar him from a pension if he was
in good standing at the time of the injury.
From its title, the case of Shore v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council,19 would appear to be a case involving labor
law. An examination of the case will reveal that basically it is a
labor case but although the case has been twice tried in the District
Court and twice-appealed to the Supreme Court no question of labor
law has yet been raised in a form calling for a decision by the
Supreme Court. There will be a third trial in the District Court
and probably a third appeal, and perhaps some later reviewer will
have occasion to review the labor questions involved.

FAMILY LAW, PROBATE LAW, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SAM FRAZIN, of the Denver Bar

FAMILY LAW
I. Lawson v. Lawson, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 1.
Facts: Plaintiff, the wife, was a resident of Denver throughout her entire life. She went to Fortville, Indiana, for the sole purpose of marrying the defendant who was then stationed there in
264 P. 2d 1033, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
263 P. 2d 315, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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the military service. The husband's home was in St. Joseph, Missouri, and the evidence shows he did not accept her as his wife by
the way of making or attempting to make, nor did he have any
thought of making, a domicile for her. She finally left and returned
to Denver where she filed suit for divorce alleging mental cruelty
and her residence in the state for more than one year prior to
commencement of the action. Judge Edward C. Day, after hearing the evidence, questioned the sufficiency of the showing of residence, taking the position generally that plaintiff had lost her residence in Denver by leaving the state and marrying defendant in
another state; that the domicile of the plaintiff was that of her
husband; that she should wait for one year after her return to
Denver before filing action for divorce.
Appeal: Held for Judge Day.
Reasons: A Colorado woman who marries a resident of another state acquires the domicile of her husband and must wait one
year after her return to Colorado before filing an action for
divorce in this state. It is interesting to note as said by the Supreme
Court that so far as the best interests of plaintiff are concerned,
if the time consumed in presenting this Writ of Error had been
used to allow the running of the period by filing another complaint,
after a full year's residence had been established after plaintiff's
return to Colorado, plaintiff would no doubt have had a perfectly
good and valid Interlocutory Decree of Divorce long before the
date of this decision.
II. Vance v. Vance, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 1.
Facts: Plaintiff husband filed action for divorce on the ground
of cruelty committed in Colorado. Defendant wife denied and
counter-claimed alleging abandonment without cause for a Decree
of Separate Maintenance. Trial by jury found wife not guilty of
mental cruelty and husband not guilty of abandonment. Wife then
filed a motion to set aside the verdict against her and prayed for
the Decree of Separate Maintenance notwithstanding the verdict.
This motion was sustained and the verdict of the jury finding that
the husband was not guilty of abandonment without just cause was
set aside. A Decree of Separate Maintenance was granted to the
wife and alimony of $305.00 per month. Later husband filed a
motion to modify the decree by terminating the maintenance on
the ground that since the entry thereof the wife had been guilty of
serious misconduct. The matter was heard before Honorable Robert W. Steele. Judge Steele found that by the misconduct the wife
had forfeited the right to further maintenance from plaintiff.
At the time of this hearing a divorce suit filed by the husband
was pending before Honorable William A. Black in another division
of the District Court. It was stipulated between counsel that this
divorce case be transferred from Judge Black's division to that of
Judge Steele and that the testimony received by Judge -Steele in
the separate maintenance hearing be considered by him as testi-
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mony in support of the ground of cruelty alleged in the divorce
petition. Accordingly this was heard by Judge Steele as a noncontested divorce action the wife having filed no answer. Judge
Steele considered the testimony presented in the separate maintenance hearing and entered an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce
for plaintiff husband. About' three months later defendant wife
filed a motion to set aside the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce which
was over-ruled. Counsel contends that the trial court erred in
over-ruling the motion to vacate and set aside the Interlocutory
Decree generally on the ground that an Interlocutory Decree in
Divorce cannot be granted without the presentation of any evidence; that the parties cannot stipulate that the testimony in another case be considered as evidence sufficient for the entry of a
Decree of Divorce.
Appeal: Held for husband.
Reasons: 1. The right to separate maintenance may be lost
by serious acts of misconduct.
2. Parties may stipulate that the record of testimony in a
separate maintenance action shall be accepted as a substitute for
evidence in a later divorce case when that testimony relates to the
same parties, time and events. This is not a stipulation that a
divorce be granted.
III. Russ v. Russ, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 2.
Facts: Plaintiff wife divorced defendant husband. Husband
had adopted James, a minor son of the wife by a former marriage.
The decree provided "to pay for the support of James the sum of
$100.00 per month and further to pay all medical expenses that
may be incurred necessarily for James Russ including the cost of
any necessary operations until he should become 18 years of age."
It was further agreed and provided in the decree that a named
mutual friend shall be the sole judge as to the necessity of medical
and special care and expenditures for James Russ, but if for any
reason she cannot or does not exercise her judgment in the matter
then the question of medical necessities and attention shall be decided by the District Court of Alamosa County; Colorado or by any
judge.
Wife thereafter filed motion to require former husband to
pay $1661.45 for hospital and medical expenses. Court ordered
husband to pay bills totaling $1381.11.
Appeal: Held for defendant husband.
Reasons: 1. A husband cannot be compelled to pay unnecessary medical expenses for a child where the terms of the divorce
decree obligate him only to pay such expenses which are incurred
necessarily.
2. The mutual friend named in the decree had in writing declined to exercise her judgment in the matter. The provisions of
the agreement and the decree made the role of the judge that of an
arbitrator rather than that of the judge of the court. He took on
the status of the named mutual friend who declined to act and in
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that capacity he should have listened to the evidence and made his
finding as to the necessity of the expenses and then the court should
have acted upon the findings so made.
3. In the absence of a decree or an agreement between the
parties the liability for medical payments lies within the discretion
of the Court.
IV. Miller v. Miller, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 5.
Facts: Plaintiff wife sued for divorce seeking custody and
control of two minor children. Defendant husband was granted the
divorce on his cross-complaint and given full custody and control
of the children. After the entry of the final decree the wife filed a
motion for modification of the decree which later the court modified directing that the wife have custody of the children during the
months of June, July and August of each year. Not being satisfied
with this modification she appealed to the District Court which
denied the motion and entered an order to the effect that the original order as entered in the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce remain
in full force and effect.
Appeal: Held for plaintiff wife.
Reasons: Where a child becomes a ward of a County Court by
virtue of a divorce action the court has continuing jurisdiction and
a custody order is not a final judgment which can be appealed. I
recommend the reading of the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Moore and concurred in by Mr. Justice Clark.)
V. Faith v. Faith, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 5.
Facts: Plaintiff husband filed suit against defendant wife for
divorce. Wife counter claimed and later withdrew her answer and
permitted cause to proceed as a non-contested case, resulting in
entry of Intelocutory Decree in favor of plaintiff. Decree contained
usual provisions. One week before Decree became final plaintiff filed
motion requesting the court to vacate and set aside the Interlocutory Decree. Court granted this motion over the objection of the
defendant.
Appeal: Held for plaintiff.
Reasons: Trial court must grant a motion to dismiss and set
aside an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce a few days before it becomes final even though the motion states no reasons, is not supported by the evidence and is objected to by the defendant. The
policy of the court is to discourage rather than encourage divorces.
One may well be entitled to a divorce but whether or not he will
exercise that right is optional with him.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. Higgins v. Sinnock, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 9.
Facts: Old age pensioners, the phintiffs herein, are complaining about an amendment to the Old Age Pension Act which concerns payments to inmates of mental institutions. As a method of
procedure the payments are to be made to the Chief Financial Officer of the institution and he in turn is to disburse the money to
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the inmates. The pensioners complain that this method of procedure is unconstitutional. The pensioners, the plaintiffs herein,
are in no way connected with any institution.
Appeal: Held for defendants.
Reasons: This amendment sets up payments to inmates of
institutions and said payments are to be made to the Chief Financial Officer. Thus only the rights of two parties are involved herein. They are (1) the Chief Financial Officer and (2) the inmates
of the institutions. Petitioners do not fall into either group for
they are merely old age pensioners.
An act entitling inmates of a state institution to participate
with others in proceeds of the old age pension fund is constitutional
and only parties in interest can challenge the constitutionality of
the method of payment provided. The pensioners in this case have
no interest in this act.
II.

People v. Schaeffer, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 11.
Facts: Plaintiff herein was adopted by her uncle now deceased
after she had reached her majority. Defendant, Inheritance Tax
Department taxed plaintiff as a Class C beneficiary, a niece. Plaintiff contends she is a Class A beneficiary-an adopted child.
The statutory provisions pertinent in this case are contained
in Section 14, Chapter 85, '35 CSA as amended by Chapter 146,
SL 41 which imposes a graduated rate of tax upon inheritance
by dividing beneficiaries into classes. Class A is subject to the lowest rate of tax and includes a father, mother, husband, wife, child
or any child or children legally adopted as such. The portion of the
statute which forms the basis of this controversy is as follows:
"Provided, however, that for the purpose of this act no person shall
be considered legally adopted unless the adoption decree was entered prior to such person reaching the age of 21 years."
There is approximately $10,000.00 involved herein. Plaintiff
contends that in setting up the age of 21 the legislature was arbitrary, unjustly discriminate and therefore this part of the act is
unconstitutional.
Appeal: Held for defendant.
Reasons: 1. 21 is not an arbitrary age. The reasoning is that
if a person is under 21 and is adopted greater family ties occur.
2. If a person is adopted over the age of 21 it is quite often
done so as to evade paying inheritance taxes.
3. Legislation which sets up two classes of adopted children
for inheritance tax purposes based upon whether the child was
adopted before or after age 21 is not discriminatory or unconstitutional for such classifications have sanction in reason and logic.
4. Stare decisis does not mean the perpetuation of error. The
Court here refers to a former case in which the opinion was just
the opposite, being Hoggan v. The People being opinions dated
August 14, 1954, Issue No. 17 and the Supreme Court hereby overrules its opinion in that case.
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I. Kling v. Phayer, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 18.
Facts: Plaintiff, administratrix of Phayer estate, sues defendant for $112.50 damages to Phayer's automobile and $707.82
for funeral expenses. Defendant's negligence was clearly established and is not at issue. Defendant claims administratrix cannot
maintain an action for the recovery of funeral expenses. It is contended that this can only be collected under the Wrongful Death
Statute which limits the parties in interest to the immediate family, and plaintiff is not a member of the immediate family in this
case. However, the plaintiff adminstratrix contends she has the
right to maintain the action under our Survival Statute being
Chapter 176, Section 247, '35 CSA which reads, "All actions in law
whatsoever save and except actions on the case for slander or
libel, or trespass or injuries done to the person, and actions
brought for the recovery, of real estate, shall survive to and against
executors, administrators and conservators."
Appeal: Held for plaintiff.
Reasons: The present action is for recovery independent of
the Wrongful Death Statute. The administratrix here is not seeking to recover for injuries to the person as provided in the Statute
but is trying to recover for damages to decedent's property, that
is: Diminution of decedent's estate which would result from the
payment of the funeral bill.
The instant case is an action in law as provided in Section 247,
Chapter 176, '35 CSA Supra and is not one of the exceptions,
namely an action for slander or libel or trespass for injuries done
to the person nor for the recovery of real estate, and therefore it
survives to the administratrix. So under the Survival Statute an
administratrix can recover for the diminution of the estate as a
result of damages to an automobile and the payment of funeral
expenses.
RE: A. C. McLaughlin, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 7.
Facts: Testator, a resident of California left a holographic
will unwitnessed and in which he left certain Colorado property to
his sister and the residue to the Texas School of Medicine. The
will was valid in California and admitted to probate. It was later
admitted in this jurisdiction as a foreign will. Two minors of the
deceased daughter of the testator who were excluded from the will
filed a caveat through their guardian claiming:
(1) The will because it is holographic and unwitnessed though
validly executed in California is voidable in Colorado as to Colorado
real estate despite the provisions of the Colorado foreign will
statute.
(2) The gift in the will to testator's surviving sister is void
for vagueness, ambiguousness, uncertainty and impossibility of
administration.
(3) The gift in the will to the University of Texas is likewise
II.
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void because the "School of Medicine, University of Texas," is not a
legal entity capable of taking a gift.
Appeal: Judgment affirmed.
Reasons: A foreign will if valid in a foreign jurisdiction is
valid in Colorado and may be admitted to probate. The filing of a
caveat although permissible does not effect the validity of a foreign
will.
Section 39, Chapter 176, '35 CSA provides that a will must
be in writing, signed and acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two witnesses and declared by him to be his last will and
testament. Section 62A as amended in 1947 provides, "As used in
this section the words 'foreign will' means an instrument in writing which has been or shall be admitted to probate as the last will
and testament or codicil of a decedent before any court or tribunal
other than a court of this state, such court or tribunal being
authorized by the laws of such jurisdiction to admit the same to
probate, whether or not such instrument was executed in accordance with Section 39 of this Chapter."
It is further provided in this opinion that the devise to the
sister was not ambiguous and, therefore, valid.
It is also further provided that the devise to the Texas School
of Medicine was valid as shown by these citations. The School of
Medicine was a part of the University of Texas and as such a legal
entity.

ATTORNEYS, COURTS, EQUITY
By FLOYD K. MURR, of the Walsenburg Bar
ATTORNEYS

Under the classification of attorneys two cases were decided
by the Supreme Court during the past year. In People v. Logan,1
the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who wrongfully spent
for his own purpose money received by him from his client for the
purchase of property. The attorney had also retained money collected by him for clients, refusing to make settlement until after
complaint was made to the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association. The referee had recommended suspension but the Court felt
compelled to go beyond because of the gravity of the charges.
In People v. Woodall,2 a layman was fined $200 by the Supreme
Court for drafting and causing to be executed a will. The only
phase of the case presenting a new element was the defense of
respondent, a bank cashier, who alleged he did it because the town's
only resident attorney was always away. The Court apparently
was not impressed with this unusual defense.
11953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
2 1953-54, C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.

